Unveiling the Hidden Threat: How China Conducts Espionage in the UK

It is a question that successive governments have struggled with: what kind of threat does China really pose to the UK?

Trying to answer it may have contributed to the high-profile collapse of the case in which two British men, Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, were accused of spying for China and charged under the Official Secrets Act.

Both deny wrongdoing - but when charges were dropped last month, it sparked political outcry.

Prosecutors and officials have since offered conflicting accounts about whether a failure or unwillingness to label China as an active threat to national security led to the withdrawal of the charges. And yesterday Lord Hermer, the attorney general, blamed 'out of date' legislation for the case's collapse.

But this all raises the question of what exactly Chinese espionage looks like in the modern world.

On one level, China spies within the traditional framework of the old ways of human espionage associated with the Cold War, with spies working under the cover of being diplomats, and recruiting people to pass secrets.

The witness statement by a deputy national security adviser for prosecutors investigating the now-collapsed case of Cash and Berry outlines this kind of work.

The Chinese Intelligence Services are interested in acquiring information from a number of sources, including policymakers, government staff, and democratic institutions and are able to act opportunistically to gather all information they can.

Here is the thing though. Pretty much every country does this kind of spying - wanting insight into what other countries are up to is as old as the hills. The UK conducts this kind of espionage against China (as China itself has publicly complained about). When countries get caught, there is normally a public row but each side knows it is normal business.

But this barely covers the breadth of the Chinese behaviour that worries security officials.

Try not to think too much just in terms of classic card-carrying spies based out of the embassy in the John le Carre mould, the head of MI5 Sir Ken McCallum said during a briefing on national security threats earlier this month.

For what truly sets China apart - and what lies at the heart of the problem - is that the national security threats China poses go beyond traditional notions of espionage.

To complicate matters further, some of the threats are also closely tied up with the reasons many believe we need to engage with China.

China's economic power, for example, presents many potential benefits for a UK desperate for growth.

Labour is reported to be seeking to improve ties with China. However, securing the benefits of a relationship while navigating the associated risks is the hard task that has bedevilled governments.

The sheer size of Chinese intelligence – which some estimates put at half a million when you account for the entire workforce operating on security both at home and abroad – means they can afford to pursue their work at a larger scale than many other countries.

Every country uses its intelligence services differently - how it does so throws a spotlight on the priorities of the state - and in China, the top priority is ensuring the continued rule of the Communist Party.

In practice this has meant influencing political debate abroad, going after dissidents, collecting data at a large scale and ensuring economic growth at home.

In the UK, concerns about Chinese political influence have been growing.

MI5 issued an interference alert in January 2022 about the activities of an alleged Chinese agent, Christine Lee, who was believed to have infiltrated Parliament.

Ms Lee denied the allegations. She later took unsuccessful legal action against MI5 and told a tribunal that the spy agency's alert about her carried a political purpose.

MI5 has also warned that Beijing was cultivating local politicians in the early stages of their career with the hope of seeding them into more senior positions - a sign of a long-term, patient strategy to build influence.

Here, the purpose was not stealing secrets or gaining information so much as manipulating political debate – having people in influential positions who will take a pro-China view of issues and the world.

Another area that worries UK security officials is China's predilection for spying on dissidents, known as transnational repression, something that has been a primary target for Chinese intelligence for years with a focus on groups like Tibetan campaigners.

But the arrival in the UK of many young pro-democracy activists from Hong Kong, following Beijing's clampdown, has heightened the concerns.

According to MI5, Hong Kong police have issued bounties against more than a dozen pro-democracy activists here in the UK and there have been increased reports of harassment and surveillance.

Beijing has always dismissed accusations of espionage as attempts to smear China.

China never interferes in other countries' internal affairs and always acts in an open and aboveboard manner, the Chinese embassy in London has previously said.

In a statement issued earlier this month, it added: The so-called 'China spy-case' hyped up by the UK is entirely fabricated and self-staged. China strongly condemns this...

Yet, China has been linked to some large-scale cyber operations. Some of this sits within modern notions of espionage – stealing secrets.

Last year, Beijing was accused of trying to hack into the emails of MPs.

China represents an economic threat to our security and an epoch-defining challenge, Rishi Sunak, the then-prime minister, said at the time, while avoiding formally labelling Beijing as a threat.

Then, in August, the UK finally revealed what many suspected – that it had been hit as part of a highly sophisticated espionage campaign codenamed Salt Typhoon, which compromised telecoms companies around the world.

The UK remained quiet about who exactly was hit and only spoke out in conjunction with a dozen other countries and after months of discussion behind the scenes about what it should say.

The data stolen through this activity can ultimately provide the Chinese intelligence services the capability to identify and track targets' communications and movements worldwide, the UK's National Cyber Security Centre, an arm of GCHQ, warned in a statement.